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According to a growing body of studies, people’s ability to forecast future emotional
experiences is generally biased. Nonetheless, the existing literature has mainly explored
affective forecasting in relation to specific events, whereas little is still known about
the ability to make general estimations of future emotional states. Based on existing
evidence suggesting future-oriented disposition as a key factor for mental health, the
aims of the current study were (1) to investigate the relationship between negative
(NA) and positive (PA) affective forecasting biases and perceived psychological well-
being, and (2) to explore whether positively biased predictions are associated with
resilience and foster one’s skills to cope with stressful events. To do so, we asked 85
undergraduate students to forecast PA and NA over 2 weeks, as well as to report their
daily affect through a web-based Ecological Momentary Assessment. According to the
results, positively biased PA forecasting (i.e., overestimating positive emotional states)
was associated with greater perceived psychological well-being and higher resilience.
When high levels of stress were experienced, participants holding an optimistic, yet
biased, estimation of future PA were more likely to successfully manage stressors, thus
maintaining lower levels of NA and higher levels of positive emotions. We suggest
that positively biased PA forecasting is an adaptive cognitive distortion that boosts
people’s resilience and mental health, thus opening new avenues for the promotion
of psychological well-being.
Keywords: affective forecasting, cognitive bias, ecological momentary assessment, psychological well-being,
resilience
INTRODUCTION
As terms draws to a close and summer vacations stretch out ahead, people start to mentally
imagine the upcoming holidays. For instance, they visualize themselves sleeping until late, having
a brunch with some friends or leaving for a tropical destination. Beyond envisioning activities,
people spontaneously imagine their own future emotions (Staats and Skowronski, 1992). That is,
how happy and relaxed they will feel while taking a break from work, or the excitement they will
experience while visiting a new place. As evidenced by a long tradition of research, people are
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indeed used to mentally time travel, and they always try to
imagine and predict future emotional experiences (Kahneman
and Snell, 1990; Gilbert et al., 2002; Gilbert and Wilson, 2009).
Despite some sort of insight is likely to exist (Buehler and
McFarland, 2001; Wirtz et al., 2003), research generally suggests
that inaccuracy between forecasted emotional states and future
experiences is frequent: People are not good at forecasting
feelings, and the affective states they anticipate do not match
the actual future experience (Wilson and Gilbert, 2003). Sources
of errors in affective forecasting may be connected either to the
time at which the prediction is made or to the actual experience
(Wilson and Gilbert, 2003). Regardless of the type of error, the
result is a bias in affective forecasts. In this sense, the literature has
shown that, while people are usually quite accurate at forecasting
the valence of future emotional experiences (i.e., negative or
positive) or the specific emotions they will experience (e.g., anger
or fear) (Wilson and Gilbert, 2003), they are quite biased at
estimating emotional intensity and duration, thus leading to the
so-called durability bias (i.e., the tendency to overestimate the
duration of an emotional reaction) (Gilbert et al., 1998) and
impact bias (i.e., the tendency to overestimate the impact of a
future event) (Gilbert et al., 2002; Wilson et al., 2003).
To date, a body of studies supports the idea that affective
forecasting represents an important cognitive process, and
predicting future feelings is an essential source of information to
drive behaviors (Mellers et al., 1997; Crawford et al., 2002; DeWall
et al., 2014). Accordingly, people use affective information to
make judgments and take decisions about the future (Schwarz
and Clore, 1983; Taquet et al., 2016; Colombo et al., 2020).
In addition, there is also evidence supporting that affective
forecasting is a regulatory process, that might serve as a resilience
source in the presence of difficulties. Specifically, anticipating
future feelings would be a future-oriented strategy to regulate
emotions (Goodhart, 1985), which would lead people to directly
or indirectly behave in order to match or change the forecasted
emotional experience (Persson and Sjöberg, 1985). In that
direction, Totterdell et al. (1997) asked thirty participants to
predict daily and weekly mood, as well as to annotate daily affect
at the end of the day. Results showed that, regardless of the
presence of daily hassles, mood was more likely to improve when
participants expected it to improve (i.e., when they predicted that
they would have experienced a better mood), thus supporting
the hypothesis of affective forecasting as a regulatory process
and suggesting that mood forecasts may be considered “[. . .]
as part of a process that exerts some mental control over mood”
(Totterdell et al., 1997).
Based on the previous literature, it seems plausible that the
way people anticipate affective states can have repercussions
on different aspects of life, such as happiness and well-being
(Dunn et al., 2007a; Gilbert and Wilson, 2009; Buchanan et al.,
2019; Nasso et al., 2019), physical and mental health (Sieff
et al., 1999; Riis et al., 2005), and interpersonal relations (Dunn
and Laham, 2006). Consequently, biases in affective forecasting,
either positive or negative, may entail several consequences for
mental health. Indeed, positive illusions such as favorable self-
evaluations, exaggerated perception of control, and unrealistic
optimism have been shown to boost happiness and well-being
(Taylor and Brown, 1988, 1994; Brookings and Serratelli, 2007).
These cognitive biases are likely to increase the perception
of owning successful copying skills (Brown, 1993), which in
turn enhances motivation and enthusiasm while carrying out
actions (Taylor and Gollwitzer, 1995). Similarly, a positive future-
oriented disposition and openness to the future (i.e., having
positive expectations and a general disposition of acceptance
toward the future) have been shown to be protective factors for
mental health and to be positively associated with well-being
(Weinstein, 1980; Mikus et al., 2017; Botella et al., 2018).
In the present study, we aimed to explore affective forecasting
in a sample of undergraduate students. Contrary to the previous
literature that mainly focused on predicting emotions in relation
to a specific future event, we explored affective forecasting as
a future-oriented disposition in healthy individuals by asking
for general future affective estimations. The main objective was
to disentangle the association of affective forecasting with well-
being and resilience. To do so, we asked 85 participants to forecast
positive (PA) and negative (NA) affect over 2 weeks, and we
monitored experienced daily mood by means of a web-based
Ecological Momentary Assessment (EMA) design, which has
been shown to be an adequate methodology to capture emotional
dynamics in daily life (Colombo et al., 2019a,b).
First, we hypothesized that people with a more optimistic
view of future affect and who tend to overestimate PA will
show greater well-being. No significant association is expected
in relation to NA forecasts, because overestimating negatively
valenced emotions is known to be either an evolutionary rather
than maladaptive copying mechanism (Miron-Shatz et al., 2009),
or the consequence of a negative bias associated with anxiety
and depressive conditions (Mathersul and Ruscio, 2019), which
were excluded from the current study. Second, and in line
with the previous hypothesis, we expected that PA but not NA
forecasts will be associated with resilience. More specifically, we
hypothesized that PA under-estimators would be less resilient
than PA over-estimators. Finally, we hypothesized that biased PA
forecasts would moderate the impact of stress on affect, consistent
with the idea that holding positive expectations about the future
represents a further source of resilience to cope with daily events.
METHODS
We reported how we determined our sample size, all data
exclusions (if any), all manipulations, and all measures in the
study (Simmons et al., 2012).
Sample
The sample size was calculated considering the correlations as the
main analyses of the study. Assuming an overall moderate effect
size of 0.3 (correlation), a significance level of 5%, a statistical
power of 80%, and a bilateral contrast, the sample size calculation
resulted in a sample of n = 82. Calculations were made with
G∗Power (Faul et al., 2007).
In total, 91 undergraduate students were recruited via online
advertisements at the Jaume I University (Castellon, Spain).
Participants with a score above 14 on the Patient Health
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Questionnaire (PHQ-9) (Kroenke et al., 2001) and/or the
Generalized Anxiety Disorder (GAD-7) (Spitzer et al., 2006) were
excluded from the study (i.e., individuals with moderate/severe
clinical conditions). Accordingly, there is evidencing showing
that patients suffering from Major Depressive Disorder (MDD)
or Generalized Anxiety Disorder (GAD) are negatively biased in
affective forecasting (Wenze et al., 2012; Mathersul and Ruscio,
2019), which would make their inclusion together with non-
clinical individuals problematic. Accordingly, 6 participants were
excluded, thus leading to a final sample of n = 85. The sample
was composed of 72 females and 13 males, and their mean
age was 20.81 years (SD = 2.26). In our sample, the PHQ-9’s
internal consistency was α = 0.73, whereas the GAD-7’s internal
consistency was α = 0.82.
This study was approved by the ethics committee of the Jaume
I University (Spain) (certificate number: CD/57/2019; reference:
41EA95C7D3C8747F0A37), and informed consent was obtained
from all participants.
Measures
Forecasted Positive and Negative Affect
Participants were administrated the Spanish adaptation (Díaz-
García et al., 2020) of the Positive and Negative Affect Schedule
(PANAS) (Watson et al., 1988). The PANAS is composed of 10
items to measure PA and 10 items to assess NA. Previous research
has shown the validity and reliability of the questionnaire (Sandín
et al., 1999). In the present study, the original instructions
“Indicate the extent you have felt this way over the past week” were
changed to “Indicate the extent you think you will feel over the
next two weeks” to evaluate forecasted as opposed to retrospective
affect. In our sample, both the PA and the NA subscales showed
good internal consistency (PA: α = 0.91; NA: α = 0.78).
Psychological Well-Being
Psychological well-being was assessed using the Spanish
adaptation (Díaz-García et al., 2020) of the Ryff’s Psychological
Well-Being Scale (Ryff and Keyes, 1995; Ryff, 2005), which
explores six different dimensions of psychological well-being:
Autonomy (i.e., independence from external judgments and
social prejudices: “I have confidence in my opinions, even if
they are contrary to the general consensus”; “I judge myself
by what I think is important, not by the values of what others
think is important”), environmental mastery (i.e., the ability to
take advantage of the environment to achieve personal goals:
“I am quite good at managing the many responsibilities of my
daily life”; “In general, I feel I am in charge of the situation in
which I live”), personal growth (i.e., the sense of continuous
self-improvements thanks to life experiences: “For me, life has
been a continuous process of learning, changing, and growth”;
“I have the sense that I have developed a lot as a person over
time”), purpose in life (i.e., the sense of meaning in life, owning
clear personal values and life goals: “I have a sense of direction
and purpose in life”; “I enjoy making plans for the future
and working to make them a reality”), positive relations (i.e.,
satisfactory and trusting relationships, as well as empathetic and
warm attitude toward others: “People would describe me as a
giving person, willing to share my time with others”; “I know
that I can trust my friends, and they know they can trust me”),
and self-acceptance (i.e., positive attitude toward the current
and past self, as well as acceptance of both positive and negative
personal qualities: “When I look at the story of my life, I am
pleased with how things have turned out”; “When I compare
myself to friends and acquaintances, it makes me feel good
about who I am”). This scale has shown good psychometric
properties (van Dierendonck, 2004). In our sample, all subscales
demonstrated good internal consistency, except for autonomy
and environmental mastery (self-acceptance: α = 0.87; positive
relation: α = 0.83; autonomy: α = 0.64; environmental mastery:
α = 0.67; personal growth: α = 0.83; purpose in life: α = 0.78).
Resilience
Resilience was assessed using the Spanish adaptation (Notario-
Pacheco et al., 2011) of the 10-item Connor-Davidson Resilience
Scale (CD-RISC10) (Campbell-Sills and Stein, 2007), a self-report
scale with good psychometric properties (Singh and Yu, 2017;
Shin et al., 2018) that measures resilience over the previous
30 days (“I can deal with whatever comes my way”; “I think of
myself as a strong person when dealing with life’s challenges and
difficulties”). In our sample, the CD-RISC10 showed high internal
consistency (α = 0.85).
Openness to Future
The Openness to the Future Scale (OFS) is a 10-item self-
report questionnaire that measures orientation toward the future,
including positive expectations, a sense of competence to cope
with daily events, and the acceptance of what can’t be predicted.
Some examples include: “I calmly accept that good and bad
things will happen to me in life”; “I am very excited about future
opportunities and challenges”; “I feel hopeful about what the
future may bring.” This scale has shown good psychometric
properties both in community and clinical samples (Botella
et al., 2018). In our sample, the OFS showed good internal
consistency (α = 0.80).
Ecological Momentary Affect (EMA)
Measures
At each daily evaluation, participants were asked to complete
three 100-point numerical scales (0 = not at all; 100 = extremely)
evaluating momentary PA (“To what extent are you experiencing
positive emotions at this moment?”), momentary NA (“To what
extent are you experiencing negative emotions at this moment?”),
and momentary stress (“How would you rate your current level
of stress?”). Participants were also asked to rate the momentary
level of seven positive emotions (happiness, fun, hope, serenity,
excitement, pride, gratitude) using a 1-5 Likert scale (“To what
extent are you experiencing the following positive emotions at this
moment?; 1 = not at all; 5 = extremely). The sum of the seven
scales reflected the momentary level of positive emotions.
Procedure
Participants were recruited via poster advertisements at the
Jaume I University (Castellon, Spain). Students interested in the
study were invited to the laboratory in order to receive more
information about the investigation. Participants who met the
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inclusion criteria were invited to sign the informed consent and
to complete the affective forecasting measure with the PANAS.
Repeated daily assessments were collected by means of
Qualtrics, a web-based platform that allows to create and send
customized online surveys at specific time points during the day.
In the present study, participants were semi-randomly prompted
three times a day for 2 weeks (between 9:30 – 14:00; 14:00 –
18:30; and 18:30 – 23:00) by means of an email. After receiving
the notification, participants had 60 min to enter the weblink and
complete the evaluation.
At the end of the study, participants returned to the
laboratory and completed the following questionnaires: The
Ryff’s Psychological Well-being Scale, the CD-RISC and the
OFS. Additionally, participants were asked whether something
significant unexpectedly happened in the previous 2 weeks.
This included any sudden and unforeseen positive and/or
negative event that significantly affected their mood, thoughts,
or behaviors. This question was introduced in order to exclude
participants that, during the study, experienced an event that was
impossible to anticipate (such as a sentimental breakup, the death
of a closer person, or being hired at a new job), thus creating a
biased mismatch between the predicted and experienced affect.
However, no participant reported such significant events and
there was no need for exclusion. A remuneration of 10 euros
was given to participants who completed more than 60% of the
EMA assessments.
Data Analysis
A summary of all the variables included in the analysis and their
abbreviations is reported in Table 1. Forecasted affect refers to the
PANAS-PA and PANAS-NA subscale scores collected at baseline.
Experienced affect refers to mean PA and NA levels experienced
during the 2-week EMA, and it was obtained by calculating
the mean of the 42 possible PA and NA assessments for each
participant. Besides, EMA scores refer to the 42 possible NA,
PA, positive emotions and stress repeated assessments collected
throughout the 2-week study.
To distinguish between future affect overestimation or
underestimation, delta scores were computed. To have the same
range of scores for forecasted (PANAS: 1-to-5 Likert scale) and
TABLE 1 | Summary of all the variables included in the analysis and
their abbreviations.
Abbreviation Variable
Forecasted PA Anticipated PA – PANAS at baseline
Forecasted NA Anticipated NA – PANAS at baseline
Experienced PA Global average of EMA-PA assessments
Experienced NA Global average of EMA-NA assessments
EMA-PA PA repeated EMA assessments
EMA-NA NA repeated EMA assessments
EMA-Stress Stress repeated EMA assessments
EMA-positive emotions Positive emotions repeated EMA assessments
Delta PA (Forecasted PA – Experienced PA)
Delta NA (Forecasted NA – Experienced NA)
experienced affect measures (EMA: 0–100 scale), PANAS values
were transformed to Percent of Maximum Possible (POMP)
Scores (Cohen et al., 1999; Fischer and Milfont, 2010). POMP
scores express raw scores in terms of the maximum possible score
and can range between 0 and 100, thus facilitating the comparison
of data when scales and scoring methods are not consistent.
POMP scores are calculated as follows: 100 × (raw-min) / (max-
min), with min and max indicating the lowest and highest
scores possible according to the scale adopted. POMP scores
of forecasted affect were calculated as follows: POMP scores:
100 × (raw - 10)/(50 - 10). Delta scores were therefore computed
as follows: Delta = (POMP forecasted affect – experienced affect).
Positive scores reflected future affect overestimation, whereas
negative scores reflected future affect underestimation.
Correlation analyses were conducted to explore the
association between forecasted and experienced NA, and
between forecasted and experienced PA. Moreover, Generalized
Estimating Equations (GEEs) with an unstructured correlation
matrix structure and Huber–White standard error estimates were
used, introducing forecasted PA and NA as predictors of daily
EMA-NA and EMA-PA scores. GEEs are designed to examine
longitudinal repeated-measures data. Furthermore, GEEs are
adequate to draw inferences by considering not only variations
in affective experience over time within individuals, but also
variations in affective experience between individuals (Liang and
Zeger, 1986; Pavani et al., 2016). Forecasted and experienced
PA (Paired sample t-test) and NA scores (Wilcoxon Signed
Ranks Test) were compared to test the participants’ ability to
predict future affect. Also, delta scores distribution was explored,
and their association with depressive and anxiety symptoms
was investigated.
To confirm the first hypothesis, correlation analyses
were conducted to explore the association between
forecasted/experienced affect, delta scores, well-being, and
openness to the future. GEEs with an unstructured correlation
matrix structure were used introducing forecasted NA, forecasted
PA, daily EMA-PA and daily EMA-NA simultaneously as
predictors of psychological well-being.
To explore the association between affective forecasting and
resilience, correlation analyses were conducted. Besides, multiple
linear regressions were performed using well-being measures as
dependent variables and resilience as the independent variable; in
a second block, delta scores were included to explore significant
improvements in the model.
Consistent with the third hypothesis, we performed GEEs with
an unstructured correlation matrix structure and Huber–White
standard error estimates including delta scores, daily EMA-stress
scores and the interaction term as predictors of daily affect.
RESULTS
Forecasted and Experienced Affect
An overview of the recruited sample is reported in Table 2.
Overall, high compliance was obtained (M = 80.47%;
SD = 18.44%), considering previous research exploring
the extent to which participants tend to answer EMAs
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TABLE 2 | Detailed information about the recruited sample and affect measures
(GAD-7: Generalized Anxiety Disorder; PHQ-9: Patient Health Questionnaire).
Sample (n = 85)
Demographics
Age 20.81 (±2.26)
Sex 72 female/13 male
GAD-7 5.12 (±3.47)
PHQ-9 5.69 (±2.93)
Compliance (%) 80.47 (±18.44)
Affect
Forecasted PA-pomp 50.21 (±18.48)
Forecasted NA-pomp 18.71 (±11.76)
Experienced PA 55.60 (±18.46)
Experienced NA 22.06 (±12.26)
(Colombo et al., 2018; Van Genugten et al., 2020). Compliance
was associated with depressive (r = −0.21, p = 0.05) and
anxiety symptoms (r = −0.21, p < 0.05), but not with age
(r = 0.18, p = 0.11).
Forecasted and experienced PA (r = 0.45, p < 0.001) and NA
levels (r = 0.43, p < 0.001) were significantly correlated, thus
indicating a good degree of participants’ self-insight about future
affect. Forecasted PA significantly predicted EMA-PA scores
(B = 1.27, SD = 0.18, 95% CI [0.91, 1.63]; p < 0.001); similarly,
forecasted NA significantly predicted EMA-NA scores (B = 0.94,
SD = 0.18, 95% CI [0.58, 1.30]; p < 0.001).
Participants forecasted lower levels of PA than what they
experienced (forecasted PA-POMP: mean = 50.21, SD = ±18.48;
experienced PA: mean = 55.60, SD = ±18.46; t (84) = −2.57,
p < 0.05). Similarly, a significant difference was observed
between forecasted NA and experienced NA scores (forecasted
NA-POMP: mean = 18.71, SD = ±11.76; experienced NA:
mean = 22.06, SD = ±12.26; Z = −2.60, p < 0.01). Mean delta
PA was -5.40 (SD = 19.37), whereas mean delta NA was -3.35
(SD = 13.29), thus indicating a general tendency to underestimate
future affective states. No significant correlation was observed
between delta PA and delta NA (r = −0.13, p = 0.25).
Participants with higher depressive symptoms anticipated to
experience higher NA (r = 0.36, p < 0.001) and lower PA levels
(r = −21, p = 0.05). However, delta values were not significantly
associated with PHQ-9 scores (delta PA: r = −0.11, p = 0.30;
delta NA: r = 0.20, p = 0.07), thus indicating that individuals with
higher depressive symptoms forecasted and actually experienced
lower levels of PA and higher levels of NA. Differently, forecasted
NA (r = 0.65, p < 0.001) was significantly associated with anxiety
symptoms, and delta NA significantly correlated with (r = 0.28,
p < 0.01) and predicted delta NA [R2 = 0.11; F(1, 83) = 10.30;
B = 0.83, SE = 0.03, 95% CI [0.03, 0.14]; p < 0.01], highlighting
greater overestimation of future NA in the presence of increased
anxiety symptoms.
Affective Forecasting and Well-Being
Table 3 shows the association between psychological well-being
measures and forecasted/experienced affect. Forecasted PA (self-
acceptance: r = 0.53, p < 0.001; positive relations: r = 0.32,
p < 0.01; autonomy: r = 0.43, p < 0.001; environmental mastery:
r = 0.44, p < 0.001; personal growth: r = 0.42, p < 0.001; purpose
in life: r = 0.42, p < 0.001) but not experienced PA significantly
correlated with all Ryff’s subscales, revealing that participants
holding more optimistic predictions of future PA reported greater
psychological well-being. Additionally, forecasted NA showed
a significant negative association with Ryff’s subscales of self-
acceptance (r = −0.37, p < 0.001), autonomy (r = −0.27,
p < 0.05), environmental mastery (r = −0.33, p < 0.01), and
personal grow (r = −0.23, p < 0.01), while experienced NA did
not correlate with any of the well-being measures.
Table 3 also shows the association between biased affective
forecasting and psychological well-being. Delta PA was
significantly correlated with all Ryff’s psychological well-
being measures (self-acceptance: r = 0.33, p < 0.01; positive
relations: r = 0.28, p < 0.01; autonomy: r = 0.38, p < 0.001;
environmental mastery: r = 0.26, p < 0.05; personal growth:
r = 0.28, p < 0.05; purpose in life: r = 0.33, p < 0.01): That is,
positively biased PA forecasting was associated with enhanced
perceived well-being. Consistently with our hypothesis, delta
NA did not correlate with any of the well-being measures.
When simultaneously included in a regression model to predict
psychological well-being, delta PA was the only significant
predictor of self-acceptance [R2 = 0.11; F(1, 82) = 5.21; delta
PA: B = 0.10, SE = 0.03, 95% CI [0.03, 0.16]; p < 0.01; delta
NA: B = −0.19, SE = 0.04, 95% CI [-0.11, 0.07]; p = 0.70],
positive relations [R2 = 0.11; F(1, 82) = 5.11; delta PA: B = 0.09,
SE = 0.03, 95% CI [0.02, 0.15]; p < 0.05; delta NA: B = −0.07,
SE = 0.05, 95% CI [-0.17,.02]; p = 0.13], autonomy [R2 = 0.14;
F(1, 82) = 6.91; delta PA: B = 0.10, SE = 0.03, 95% CI [0.04,.16];
p < 0.001; delta NA: B = −0.02, SE = 0.04, 95% CI [-0.10, 0.06];
p = 0.64], environmental mastery [R2 = 0.09; F(1, 82) = 3.97;
delta PA: B = 0.05, SE = 0.02, 95% CI [0.01, 0.10]; p < 0.05;
delta NA: B = −0.4, SE = 0.03, 95% CI [-0.11, 0.02]; p = 0.19],
personal growth [R2 = 0.10; F(1, 82) = 4.53; delta PA: B = 0.08,
SE = 0.03, 95% CI [0.03, 0.13]; p < 0.01; delta NA: B = −0.01,
SE = 0.04, 95% CI [-0.09, 0.07]; p = 0.81], and purpose in life
[R2 = 0.11; F(1, 82) = 4.94; delta PA: B = 0.09, SE = 0.03, 95% CI
[0.03, 0.15]; p < 0.01; delta NA: B = −0.01, SE = 0.04, 95% CI
[-0.09, 0.06]; p = 0.78].
Besides, forecasted PA (forecasted PA: r = 0.47, p < 0.001), and
forecasted NA (r = −0.21, p = 0.05) were significantly associated
with OFS. Additionally, only delta PA was significantly associated
with OFS (r = 0.25, p < 0.05), suggesting that participants
who overestimated future PA were more likely to report greater
openness to the future.
Using GEEs, forecasted affect and EMA affect scores were
simultaneously included as predictors of Ryff’s well-being
measures (Table 4). Forecasted PA was the only significant
predictor of positive relations (B = 0.54, SE = 0.08, 95% CI
[0.09, 0.42]; p < 0.01), personal growth (B = 0.27, SE = 0.06,
95% CI [0.14, 0.39]; p < 0.001), and purpose in life (B = 0.31,
SE = 0.07, 95% CI [0.17, 0.45]; p < 0.001), whereas both
forecasted NA and forecasted PA significantly predicted self-
acceptance (forecasted PA: B = 0.39, SE = 0.06, 95% CI [0.27,
0.51]; p < 0.001; forecasted NA: B = −0.33, SE = 0.09, 95% CI
[-0.51, -0.15]; p < 0.001), autonomy (forecasted PA: B = 0.28,

















TABLE 3 | Correlations among all the variables included in the analyses.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16
1. Forecasted
NA
1.00 − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − −
2. Forecasted
PA
−0.12 1.00 − − − − − − − − − − − − − −
3. Experienced
NA
0.43*** −0.15 1.00 − − − − − − − − − − − − −
4. Experienced
PA
0.04 0.45*** −0.22* 1.00 − − − − − − − − − − − −
5. Delta NA 0.48*** −0.02 0.51*** 0.20 1.00 − − − − − − − − − − −
6. Delta PA −0.16 0.53*** −0.0 −52*** −0.13 1.00 − − − − − − − − − −
7. PHQ-9 0.36*** −0.21* 0.13 −0.02 0.20 −0.12 1.00 − − − − − − − − −
8. GAD-7 0.65*** −0.16 0.30** −0.06 0.28* −0.19 0.68*** 1.00 − − − − − − − −
9. Self-
acceptance
−0.37*** 0.53*** −0.16 0.13 −0.16 0.33** −0.43** −0.45*** 1.00 − − − − − − −
10. Positive
relations
−0.19 0.32** −0.01 0.00 −0.16 0.28** −0.18 −0.23* 0.49*** 1.00 − − − − − −




−0.33** 0.44*** −0.08 0.08 −0.18 0.26* −0.37*** −0.41*** 0.72*** 0.57*** 0.41*** 1.00 − − − −
13. Personal
growth
−0.23* 0.42*** −0.05 0.06 −0.14 0.28* −0.04 −0.07 0.54*** 0.33*** 0.45*** 0.48*** 1.00 − − −
14. Purpose in
life
−0.16 0.42*** 0.01 0.07 −0.12 0.33** −0.19 −0.24* 0.66*** 0.47*** 0.38*** 0.74*** 0.61*** 1.00 − −
15. OFS −0.21* 0.47*** −0.10 0.20 −0.06 0.25* −0.30** −0.20 0.59*** 0.32*** 0.40*** 0.54*** 0.47*** 0.64*** 1.00 −
16. CD-RISC −0.27* 0.62*** −0.27* 0.19 0.05 0.37*** −0.14 −0.24* 0.53*** 0.36*** 0.46*** 0.58*** 0.55*** 0.57*** 0.60*** 1.00
Forecasted PA, experienced PA, delta NA, delta PA, Ryff autonomy, Ryff environmental mastery and OFS were normally distributed, and correlations were calculated with Pearson correlations. The remaining associations
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TABLE 4 | Generalized Estimating Equation (GEE) models introducing forecasted PA, forecasted NA, daily EMA-PA and daily EMA-NA as predictors of
well-being subscales.
Self-acceptance Positive relations Autonomy Environmental mastery Personal growth Purpose in life
B SE B SE B SE B SE B SE B SE
Coefficients
Forecasted PA 0.39*** 0.06 0.25** 0.08 0.28*** 0.07 0.24*** 0.05 0.27*** 0.06 0.31*** 0.07
Forecasted NA -0.33*** 0.09 -0.24 0.14 -0.24* 0.11 -0.29** 0.09 -0.16 0.09 -0.15 0.11
Daily PA 0.000 0.002 -0.001 0.001 -0.001 0.001 0.001 0.0003 0.000 0.001 -0.001 0.001
Daily NA -0.002 0.002 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.001 <0.001 0.0002 -0.001 0.001 0.000 0.001
B = unstandardized regression coefficient; *p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001 (PA: Positive affect; NA: Negative affect).
SE = 0.07, 95% CI [0.15, 0.41]; p < 0.001; forecasted NA:
B = −0.24, SE = 0.11, 95%CI [-0.45, -0.02]; p < 0.05), and
environmental mastery (forecasted PA: B = 0.24, SE = 0.05,
95% CI [0.14, 0.34]; p < 0.001; forecasted NA: B = −0.29,
SE = 0.09, 95% CI [-0.47, -0.11]; p < 0.01). Interestingly,
experienced daily affect did not predict any of the well-
being measures.
Affective Forecasting, Resilience and
Stress
Forecasted PA (r = 0.62, p < 0.001) and delta PA (r = 0.37,
p < 0.001) but not experienced PA (r = 0.19, p = 0.08)
significantly correlated with CD-RISC. That is, holding optimistic
expectations regarding the future and overestimating PA were
associated with higher levels of resilience. Besides, forecasted
(r = −0.27, p = < 0.05) and experienced NA (r = −0.27, p < 0.05)
but not delta NA (r = 0.05, p = 0.67) did show a significant
association with resilience (Table 3).
Resilience was a significant positive predictor of psychological
well-being (self-acceptance: R2 = 0.32; F(1, 83) = 39.87; B = 0.48,
SE = 0.08, 95% CI [0.33, 0.63]; p < 0.001; positive relations:
R2 = 0.14; F(1, 83) = 13.54; B = 0.34, SE = 0.09, 95% CI
[0.16, 0.52]; p < 0.001; autonomy: R2 = 0.21; F(1, 83) = 21.82;
B = 0.35, SE = 0.07, 95% CI [0.20, 0.50]; p < 0.001; environmental
mastery: R2 = 0.36; F(1, 83) = 46.93; B = 0.38, SE = 0.06,
95% CI [0.27, 0.49]; p < 0.001; personal growth: R2 = 0.28;
F(1, 83) = 32.22; B = 0.38, SE = 0.07, 95% CI [0.28, 0.52];
p < 0.001; purpose in life: R2 = 0.35; F(1, 83) = 44.22;
B = 0.46, SE = 0.07, 95% CI [0.32, 0.59]; p < 0.001).
The inclusion of delta PA significantly increased the variance
explained by the model for autonomy (R2 = 0.62, 1R2 = 0.05,
F(2, 82) = 14.57, CD-RISC: B = 0.28, SD = 0.08, 95% CI
[0.13, 0.44]; p < 0.001; delta PA: B = 0.07, SD = 0.03, 95% CI
[0.01, 0.12]; p < 0.05), and a close-to-significance trend was
observed in the model predicting positive relations (R2 = 0.17,
1R2 = 0.03, F(2, 82) = 8.40, CD-RISC: B = 0.28, SD = 0.10, 95%
CI [0.09, 0.47]; p < 0.001; delta PA: B = 0.06, SD = 0.03, 95%
CI [-0.01, 0.13]; p = 0.08).
Finally, GEE analyses were conducted to explore whether
EMA-stress scores and delta PA significantly predicted EMA-
affect. EMA-NA was significantly predicted by EMA-stress level
but not by delta PA (EMA-stress: B = 0.46, SD = 0.02, 95% CI
[0.42, 0.51]; p < 0.001; Delta PA: B = −0.04, SD = 0.04, 95% CI
[-0.11, 0.03]; p = 0.26), thus underlying the fundamental role of
stress on NA affect ratings (i.e., the experience of higher stress was
associated with higher levels of perceived NA). Similarly, EMA-
stress scores but not delta PA significantly predicted positive
emotion level (stress: B = −0.09, SD = 0.01, 95% CI [-0.11,
-0.08], p < 0.001; Delta PA: B = −0.02, SD = 0.02, 95% CI [-
0.07, 0.03], p = 0.46). Notably, a significantly different association
between EMA-NA and stress was observed as a function of
delta values (stress: B = 0.45, SD = 0.02, 95% CI [0.40, 0.50],
p < 0.001; Delta PA: B = 0.02, SD = 0.04, 95% CI [-0.05,
0.09], p = 0.60; interaction: B = −0.003, SD = 0.001, 95%
CI [-0.01, 0.00]; p < 0.05). As indicated by the negative beta
coefficient of the interaction (Suso-Ribera et al., 2019), as delta
PA becomes more positive (i.e., future PA is overestimated),
the contribution of stress on NA is reduced. A significantly
different association between EMA-positive emotion and stress
was also observed as a function of PA delta values (stress:
B = −0.09, SD = 0.01, 95% CI [-0.10, -0.07], p < 0.001; Delta PA:
B = −0.04, SD = 0.03, 95% CI [-0.09, 0.01], p = 0.12; interaction:
B = 0.001, SD = 0.0003, 95% CI [0.001, 0.002]; p < 0.001). As
the interactive effect of delta PA and stress on positive emotion
level is positive, this means that, as delta PA becomes more
negative (i.e., forecasting becomes more negatively biased and
future PA is underestimated), stress becomes more deleterious
for positive emotions. In other words, it is possible to suggest
that, despite the increase in experienced stress, subjects with
positively biased PA forecasting (i.e., those who overestimated
future positive affective states) reported lower NA levels and
higher positive emotions.
Regarding delta NA, EMA-PA (stress: B = −0.36, SD = 0.03,
95% CI [-0.42, -0.30], p < 0.001; Delta NA: B = 0.14, SD = 0.11,
95% CI [-0.07, 0.36], p = 0.19) was significantly predicted by
EMA-stress but not delta NA, whereas EMA-positive emotions
were significantly predicted by both stress level and delta NA
(stress: B = −0.14, SD = 0.02, 95% CI [-0.18, -0.09], p < 0.001;
Delta NA: B = 0.51, SD = 0.16, 95% CI [0.83, 0.19], p < 0.01). No
significant interaction effect was observed.
DISCUSSION
So far, a growing body of literature has explored people’s ability
to forecast emotional experiences in relation to specific future
events. In the current study, instead, we investigated affective
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forecasting as a future-oriented disposition, asking participants
to estimate their affect during a 2-week period.
The main aim of the present study was to explore whether
biased affective forecasting was associated with perceived
psychological well-being, consistently with the hypothesis that
the ability to estimate future emotional experiences constitutes
a future-oriented strategy to regulate emotions (Goodhart, 1985;
Totterdell et al., 1997).
Aligned with the previous literature (Buehler and McFarland,
2001; Wirtz et al., 2003), participants in the present study
showed a good degree of insight about their future PA and
NA levels. A significant discrepancy between forecasted and
experienced affect was also observed, and participants showed
a somewhat pessimistic view of the future. These results
diverge from what has been revealed by a growing body of
literature exploring affective forecasting in relation to specific
future events. People would indeed overestimate the impact of
both positive and negative future events (Wilson and Gilbert,
2003), due to an excessive focus on a single event in isolation
without considering the general context and background
distractions (Wilson et al., 2000). This phenomenon, called
focalism, does not occur when forecasting general emotional
states, which could explain the dissimilar results observed
in this study. Besides, our results confirmed the role played
by depressive and anxiety symptoms on affective forecasting
(Wenze et al., 2012), and the presence of mild symptoms
was associated with a negative bias, which is consistent with
the previous literature (Craske and Pontillo, 2001; Gotlib and
Joormann, 2010; Colombo et al., 2019c). Specifically, depressive
symptoms were associated with future NA overestimation and PA
underestimation, whereas anxiety symptoms only significantly
correlated with future NA overestimation. As evidenced by
the tripartite model, indeed, depression and anxiety share
the same pattern of enhanced NA, whereas low levels of
PA and anhedonia are only typical of depressive conditions
(Clark and Watson, 1991).
Coherently with the first hypothesis, participants holding
more positive estimations of future PA and positively biased
PA forecasting reported greater psychological well-being
on almost all Ryff’s subscales. Results also confirmed the
hypothesis that biased NA estimations (i.e., underestimating
or overestimating NA) were not significantly associated with
well-being, which supports the idea that a bias in negative
affective forecasting does not affect psychological well-being.
Besides, it is of particular interest that psychological well-
being was significantly predicted by forecasted but not
experienced affect. In other words, our results suggest that
psychological well-being is a grounded dimension: Rather
than momentary affect and daily events, psychological well-
being seems to be more strongly associated with resilience
and coping skills, such as holding an optimistic, even if
distorted, vision of the future. Accordingly, delta PA but not
delta NA was significantly associated with OFS, which in turn
has been found to be associated with better mental health
(Botella et al., 2018).
Our results also confirmed the second hypothesis. Contrary
to delta NA, forecasted PA as well as delta PA were strongly
associated with resilience, and participants holding more positive
estimations of future PA and overestimating future PA were
found to be more resilient. The multiple regression analyses also
showed that delta PA in addition to resilience improved the
prediction of some well-being dimensions, thus confirming the
idea that positively biased affective forecasting may constitute
a coping skill that increases individuals’ abilities to deal with
daily hassles. Consistently, and confirming our third hypothesis,
delta PA significantly moderated the impact of daily stress on
daily affect. This means that, when experiencing high levels of
stress, subjects who tended to overestimate future PA reported
lower NA and higher positive emotions than subjects who
showed a tendency to underestimate it. A positive attitude
toward the future seems therefore to be an adaptive coping
resource in highly stressful situations, allowing to maintain
better levels of momentary affect despite the presence of
intense stressors.
Even though a long tradition of research considered cognitive
distortions as maladaptive mechanisms associated with worse
mental-health (Jahoda, 1953), there is now increasing evidence
revealing that, in certain circumstances, cognitive biases may
rather be adaptive (Taylor and Brown, 1988). Specifically,
people’s perception of the future has been shown to affect
mental health (Weinstein, 1980; Mikus et al., 2017), and
openness to the future has been associated with higher positive
emotions, psychological well-being, and self-esteem (Botella
et al., 2018). This seems to be strictly connected to the
construct of optimism, defined as “[. . .] a mood or attitude
associated with an expectation about the social or material
future” (Tiger, 1979), which has been shown to increase people’s
skills to deal with challenging events (Carver et al., 2012)
and to be associated with higher subjective well-being, health
and life success (Forgeard and Seligman, 2012). Beyond the
conceptualization of optimism as an explanatory style (Seligman,
1991), the definition of optimism as one’s disposition to hold
favorable or unfavorable expectations and beliefs about the future
seems to be more coherent with our results (Carver and Scheier,
2014). In this regard, we suggest that positively biased affective
forecasting may in part reflect one’s dispositional optimism,
and it may constitute a mechanism that increases people’s skills
to deal with daily events, thus having a positive impact on
psychological well-being.
Although optimism toward the future is likely to foster coping
skills and promote well-being, it is important to note that holding
a positively biased view of reality can also be maladaptive in
certain circumstances (Chang et al., 2009). For instance, there is
evidence showing that optimistic individuals are more likely to
show gambling behaviors (Gibson and Sanbonmatsu, 2004) or to
report lower motivation when trying to quit smoking (Weinstein
et al., 2004). As suggested by Forgeard and Seligman (2012),
“the most adaptive outlook seems therefore to be mostly optimistic,
tempered with small doses of realistic pessimism when needed”:
For example, to avoid disappointment when idealizing something
that it is quite improbable to achieve. A flexible rather than rigid
positively biased perspective seems therefore to be the key of well-
being. Future research should investigate the potential role of
flexibility on affective forecasting and health-related outcomes.
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Besides, the findings of the current study have to be
considered in light of some limitations. In the present study,
we excluded individuals with clinically relevant depressive and
anxiety symptoms in order to control for the confounding
effect of a pathological negative bias (Wenze et al., 2012;
Mathersul and Ruscio, 2019). However, there are other individual
factors, which have been shown to play a fundamental role
in affective forecasting abilities. For example, personality has
been found to explain 30% of the concordance between
anticipated and experienced emotional experiences (Zelenski
et al., 2013; Hoerger et al., 2016), and introverted as compared
to extroverted individuals tend to anticipate more unpleasant
emotions and less positive emotional states. Furthermore,
there is evidence showing that people who are high in
emotional intelligence are more accurate at encoding and
predicting their emotional reactions (Dunn et al., 2007b;
Hoerger et al., 2012). Altogether, these results suggest that
affective forecasting is a complex cognitive phenomenon, in
which many different factors are likely to reciprocally interact
with each other. In addition to the previous, it is also
possible to hypothesize that an individual’s response style to
positive emotional states (Feldman et al., 2008) could be an
additional element that influences positive affective forecasting.
Accordingly, habitual positive ruminators (i.e., those who tend to
reflect on positive events, self-qualities, and pleasant emotions)
might be more likely to be positively biased toward their
future emotional states, as a result of an over-focus on positive
emotional experiences and/or qualities. Future research is needed
to prove this hypothesis and, more generally, to build a
broader framework in which all the aforementioned factors are
concurrently considered.
It is also important to note that the sample was mainly
composed of undergraduate female students. Future research
should investigate whether other factors such as sex or age
may entail different effects on affective forecasting. To date,
elderly people as compared to young individuals have been
shown to recall more positive than negative information, a
phenomenon called positivity effect (Reed and Carstensen, 2012;
Carstensen and DeLiema, 2018). However, this positivity effect
does not seem to influence elderly’s affective forecasting (Nielsen
et al., 2008), who have been shown to be accurate rather than
positively biased in the estimation of future affective states, thus
suggesting that “[. . .] people may correct for this bias as they
age.” Accordingly, the results observed in our study may not be
generalizable to all populations, and it is possible that positively
biased estimations of future states are more common in young-
to-middle adulthood.
Additionally, the methodological nature of this study only
allows to draw correlational conclusions, and more evidence is
needed to clarify the potential causal role of biased forecasting
on perceived well-being and resilience. Hence, experimental
designs could complement existing evidence assuming causal
inferences. Future studies should also consider the potential
consequences of this cognitive bias on behaviors, exploring
whether holding positive expectations about future emotions
may also affect people’s decisions in daily life. It might
be possible, indeed, that biased affect predictions influence
daily behavioral attitudes (such as avoiding or joining specific
situations), which in turn may influence well-being. Finally,
the use of single items to measure EMA-PA and EMA-NA
might not capture the complexity of momentary affect, as
opposed to the use of the PANAS for the assessment of
affective forecasting. However, we decided to use single items
in order to reduce participants’ burden and increase adherence
rates (Colombo et al., 2018, 2019c), similarly to previous
studies (Suso-Ribera et al., 2018). Besides, the autonomy and
environmental mastery Ryff’s subscales showed low internal
consistency, and analyses including both measures have to be
taken with caution.
To conclude, the benefits of enhancing PA as a way to
promote mental health and well-being has been widely supported
(Pressman et al., 2018), thus suggesting the importance of
developing specific interventions to potentiate people’s strategies
to regulate positive emotions. In particular, it is of utmost
importance to clearly determine the importance of developing
a positive bias as well as an optimistic rather than pessimistic
attitude toward the future. Besides, it is arguable that the complex
dynamic of emotional and cognitive processes that intrinsically
conform the regulatory process of individuals does not need
evaluative precision but rather intrinsic coherence that the future
will be possible to cope with.
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